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Abstract
Irreversible phenomena – such as the production of entropy and
heat – arise from fundamental reversible dynamics because the forward
dynamics is too complex, in the sense that it becomes impossible to
provide the necessary information to keep track of the dynamics. On
a heuristic level, this is well captured by coarse graining. We suggest
that on a fundamental level the impossibility to provide the necessary
information might be related to the incompleteness results of Go¨del.
This would hold interesting implications for both, mathematics and
physics.
Ever since Boltzmann tried to reduce the laws of thermodynamics in a
statistical sense to the laws of mechanics, it has been a puzzle how the no-
tions of entropy and heat of thermodynamics – which are fundamentally tied
to irreversible processes in physics – could emrge from the time reversible
laws of classical mechanics. The explanations invoked either presuppose irre-
versibility by explicit or hidden assumptions (e.g. claiming that probabilistic
arguments are only to be applied to future events while past events are facts,
see e.g. [Wei]) or rely on a form of coarse graining. Definitely, the latter is an
efficient calculational tool but as a fundamental explanation it would reduce
something as the production of heat to an arbitrary choice of coarse descrip-
tion. It does not help to call on the fundamental limits of measurement in
quantum mechanics at this point: Quantum mechanics does not limit preci-
sion in configuration space but only in phase space. In other words, quantum
mechanics only limits the precision to be achieved for coordinate and mon-
entum at the same time, for neither of the two separately. At the same time,
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the dynamics of quantum mechanics is described by a first order differential
equation (in contrast to the second order of classical mechanics) which just
means that it is completely sufficient to have only one variable (i.e. the co-
ordinate) measured precisely, in order to have sufficient initial conditions to
determine the dynamics. And this dynamics is, once again, time reversible,
i.e. it does not offer any obvious explanation for irreversible physics. We
can also not refer to the collapse of the wavefunction in measurement since
the production of heat is not dependent on the stage at which we interfer
with our observation (this stage – or cut – in the description can be nearly
arbitrarily delayed, as shown by von Neumann, see [Neu]).
The reversibility of the fundamental mechanical laws remains true even if we
pass to quantum field theory (neither does the inclusion of general relativity
for a description of gravity change the situation since it is itself positioned on
the level thermodynamics, i.e. it does not provide a microscopic explanation
for e.g. black hole entropy). Sometimes it is argued that finally the Planck
length does provide a fundamental coarse graining in confuguration space.
But a Planck scale cut-off relates to ultra high energies and it is not easily
seen how this would match the energy scales found e.g. in the production of
heat by friction. More fundamentally, AdS/CFT and black holes provide a
lot of theoretical evidence for the concept of holography, i.e. quantum grav-
ity would be a unitary theory and, therefore, time reversible, again (Strictly
speaking, it does only imply that there is always a unitary description for a
suitable choice of reference frame, e.g. that of the outside observer at infinity
for black holes).
It is true, though, that – on a heuristic basis – coarse graining does cover the
effect. What coarse graining does is giving precision – as a calulational tool –
to our naive perception that processes in physics which are irreversible have
a complicated forward dynamics. At some point, the dynamics becomes so
complicated, then, that the coarse grained description can no longer deliver
sufficient information. So, it is the complexity of the dynamics which should
offer the clue to an explanation of irreversibility.
Let us take a look at a much simpler situation, in the form of the concept
of a universal computing machine (Turing machine). As is well known, in
this case, we only have a nonvanishing contribution to entropy (and a pro-
duction of heat) if information is erased. The computational steps are all
reversible. Now, erasing informations means that the information is lost for-
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ever. The concept of a Turing machine is an axiomatic concept, i.e. it does
not provide any explanation how this erasing is to be achieved in the physical
world. But it shows that the erasing of information has to be fundamental
in order to lead to a production of entropy and heat. We can not think of
this erasing as a lack of information due to finite computational power. If
we can recover the information by a more powerful computer (even if it has
to be more powerful on a cosmological magnitude), there is no production
of entropy or heat. The reason is that the Turing machine is a universal
computing machine, and only if the information is erased in the sense of this
universal machine, do we get a production of entropy and heat.
The concept of coarse graining is just the concept of a computer of finite
computational power in disguise. So, the results on entropy and Turing ma-
chines give very strong – and mathenatically rigorous – doubt about using
coarse graining in a fundamental explanation for irreversibility.
But the case of universal Turing machines offers another clue. Go¨del’s in-
completeness results imply that there are problems which are fundamentally
beyond the reach of universal Turing machines (and, therefore, beyond math-
ematical acessability since mathematical axiom systems are nothing but pro-
grams – or program languages – running on a universal Turing machine).
The results of [Moo] show that this results in a lack of predictability of the
dynamics of all sufficiently complex systems of differential equations. The
results of [GA] give evidence that this holds, especially, for the Einstein equa-
tions of general relativity. AdS/CFT suggests that that it should then also
apply to certain quantum field theories.
If the dynamics of a system becomes so complex that Go¨del incompleteness
prohibits a complete description of its dynamics, the necessary information
– to determine the dynamics – is fundamentally lost on a universal Turing
machine. This should – from the results on universal Turing machines, men-
tioned above – imply a production of entropy and heat. So, the results of
[Moo] offer the possibility for a new Ansatz which could lead to a fundamen-
tal understanding of irreversibility and the production of entropy and heat
from Go¨del incompleteness for dynamical systems of sufficient complexity.
We should remark that this Ansatz could – as does coarse graining if
used heuristically – only work for the usual case of – on a cosmological scale
– isolated physical systems (like the case of friction). It can not explain why,
on a cosmological scale, we make the experience that much more systems
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have a more complicated forward dynamics as vice versa. The mentioned
Ansatz might only explain how entropy is produced if the forward dynamics
is sufficiently complex. The cosmological observation is rooted in the fact
that the universe started from highly ordered – and extremely unlikely – ini-
tial conditions. An explanation for this can only be searched for in a deeper
understanding of the beginning of the universe.
A few remarks are important at this point:
• If one considers true dynamical systems, described by differential equa-
tions – instead of the axiomatic concept of a universal Turing machine –
the non-predictability of the dynamics depends on the choice of axioms
system A which one uses to formalize the basis of mathematics (typ-
ically, A would be the Zermelo-Fraenkel axiom system of set theory).
Of course, a phenomenon, as the production of heat, can not depend
on the choice of A. Formulated differently, the choice of A corresponds
to a choice of program (or program language), running on a universal
Turing machine. But if we could recover the dynamics by upgrading
to better software (a different choice of axiom system A), this can not
correspond to a production of entropy and heat (since the information
is not truely erased from the universal Turing machine, in this case).
So, we would need a slightly stronger form of Go¨del incompleteness
which would make the dynamics non-predictable for any choice of ax-
iom system A.
The results of [Nab] suggest that something anlong these lines might
appear in general relativity. The results of [Nab] show that for any
fixed choice of A, one can always find a covariance problem (equiva-
lence problem of two manifolds) which can not be decided (since one
can find a manifold which can homotopically not be decided from the
sphere). Since manifolds of infinite genus are not excluded from the
path integral in gravity, it looks like one should be able to find a rel-
evant covariance problem in general relativity which would not be de-
cidable for any choice of axiom system.
Besides this, general relativity possesses a kind of universality, con-
cerning complexity in dynamical systems: Any halting problem for
universal Turing machines can be translated into a covariance problem
in general relativity (see [Nab]). So, it might be possible that any the-
ory, involving a production of entropy and heat by sufficiently complex
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dynamics (e.g. effective limits of quantum field theories, as relevant for
friction), has a dual gravitational description (along the lines of e.g.
the Navier-Stokes/gravity duality). If this would hold, one could re-
duce a proof, for the production of entropy and heat as a consequence
of Go¨del incompleteness, to the case of general relativity.
• Go¨del incompleteness has a very clear description in terms of com-
plexity. We can attach a degree of complexity to any choice of axiom
system A. If the dynamics of a system of differential equations becomes
non-predictable, we can understand this as the dynamics of the system
becoming too complex, relative to the complexity of A (see [CC], [Cha]).
The entropy should then be a quantitative measure of how much the
complexity of the dynamics exceeds that of A, i.e. it should relate to
the complexity of the dynamics relative to the complexity of A. Here,
two steps are important: First, to translate to a complexity measure
relevant to physical systems, there can be a nontrivial scaling factor in-
volved if one starts from the complexity introduced in [CC] and [Cha].
One has to fix this, e.g. by studying a suitable example. Secondly, it is
obviuous that the – in this way suitably scaled – complexity of axiom
sytems has to be bounded if one lets it run over all axiom sytems A.
Otherwise it would be impossible to extract a finite entropy from dy-
namics which should be too complex for any axiom system A (in the
way just sketched in the previous item).
If the above idea – that it might be possible to reduce the general
question to the case of general relativity – would hold true, the needed
determination of the scaling factor could be tried e.g. for a black hole
solution (like the Kerr solution). The entropy would then have to be
derived from the complexity of the dynamics of the underlying micro-
scopic degrees of freedom. Taking e.g. black hole entropy and con-
sidering these microscopic degrees of freedom in the context of string
theory, the task would essentially reduce to questions of computational
complexity/Go¨del incompleteness for the Calabi-Yau landscape. This
is a setting where complexity considerations are known to play a role
(see [DD], [Den]).
In this setting, it would be an interesting question if the mentioned
bound for the – suitably scaled – complexity of A relates to a special
Calabi-Yau and – if yes – what its meaning could be.
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• Considering black hole entropy from complexity of the microscopic de-
grees of freedom is somewhat different from studying Go¨del incomplete-
ness directly for the classical Einstein equations (as in [GA]). But black
holes constitute the case of maximal entropy in general relativity, we
can always throw an entropic system into a black hole and increase
its entropy further. In other words, all entropic situations in general
relativity can be absorbed by black holes which suggests that even
in general relativity one might possibly be able to reduce the general
case to the one of black holes. In this way, the case of [GA] should
be compatible with the microscopic explanation, e.g. from Calabi-Yau
complexity (as one should expect from the standpoint of physics).
Finally, let us remark that rooting the production of entropy and heat in
Go¨del incompleteness would – if possible – have interesting implications for
both, mathematics and physics. On the side of physics, questions like the
meaning of a possible complexity bounding Calabi-Yau (see above) would
turn up. Also, the production of heat or its absence would turn into a
powerful measure for computational unpredictability (or predictability) of
dynamics. On the side of mathematics, it would imply that constructive ap-
proaches – which try to circumvent the incompleteness results of Go¨del – can
never provide a mathematical basis for all of physics (since Go¨del incomplete-
ness would be necessary for true physical phenomena like the production of
heat).
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